We analyze a sample of 4,795 IPOs that went public between 1985 and 2003 to determine the impact of acquisition activity on long-run stock performance. After controlling for relevant factors, we find that IPOs that acquire within a year of going public significantly underperform for three-year holding periods following the first year, whereas non-acquiring IPOs do not significantly underperform over this time frame. In addition, firms that wait for more than a year after the IPO to become an acquirer do not underperform. Our event-and calendar-time results suggest that the acquisition activity of newly public firms plays a previously unrecognized role in the long-run underperformance of IPOs. 
The Desire to Acquire and IPO Long-Run Underperformance "...the buyer in M&A transactions must prepare to be disappointed. It is also true that most transactions are associated with results that are hardly consistent with optimistic expectations." Bruner (2002) 
I. Introduction
Why do newly public firms perform poorly in the years following their initial public offerings (IPOs)? Since Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) documented the long-run underperformance of IPOs, researchers have sought to explain this intriguing performance puzzle. In investigating factors that influence the long-run abnormal returns of IPOs, for example, prior studies find that prestigious underwriters and venture capital backing can act to at least partially ameliorate this poor performance (e.g., Ritter (1991) , Michaely and Shaw (1994) , Loughran and Ritter (1995) , Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) , and Brav and Gompers (1997) ).
While these factors provide valuable insights into understanding IPO performance, we propose an additional factor that is an important driver of underperformance.
Another potential explanation for the IPO performance puzzle stems from Brau and Fawcett's (2006) finding that newly-public firms are active acquirers of other firms (see also a large sample study by Celikyurt, Sevilir, and Shivdasani (2010) ). In particular, through surveys of chief financial officers of 336 firms, Brau and Fawcett (2006) find that the most important motivation for going public is to create public shares for acquiring other firms. The revelation that newly-public firms have a strong desire to acquire may be a new and important piece of the IPO performance puzzle. In this study, we investigate the connection between the merger and acquisition (M&A) motivation for going public and IPO long-run performance by examining the extent to which post-IPO merger activity helps explain IPO underperformance.
An M&A explanation for IPO underperformance seems plausible since the long-run performance of acquiring firms tends to be lackluster. For example, Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Rau and Vermaelen (1998) , among others, find that many acquirers significantly underperform in the long-run. One classic explanation for the poor performance of acquiring firms is the hubris hypothesis of Roll (1986) . Roll argues that acquiring managers become overconfident in their ability to select targets and destroy wealth by overpaying for acquisitions.
This wasting of acquiring-firm wealth translates into poor subsequent stock price performance. 1 Rau and Vermaelen also find poor bidder performance among glamour firms, or those with low book-to-market ratios. Consistent with the hubris hypothesis, Rau and Vermaelen's findings suggest that managers of glamour firms appear to be overconfident about their acquisition abilities, and investors seem to believe in management's inflated perception of their acquisition skills. Malmendier and Tate (2008) find similar evidence of the value-destroying effects of acquisitions made by bidders with a propensity towards overconfidence. 2 In addition, Kohers and Kohers (2001) show that investors tend to be overly optimistic about the future performance of acquirers in high-tech takeovers, especially if the acquirer is a glamour firm.
This type of enthusiasm may play a prominent role in IPOs, affecting both managers and investors. For example, Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2006) note that, based on their review of previous studies, entrepreneurs of start-up firms seem to be particularly prone to overconfidence 1 Other studies looking at the performance of acquiring firms include Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991) , Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) , and Loderer and Martin (1990) , among others.
2 CEO's who tend to be overconfident are classified as those with personal overinvestment in their companies, as measured by the voluntary holding of in-the-money stock options, and those described in the press as confident and/or optimistic.
(see also Landier and Thesmar (2008) , Camerer and Lovallo (1989) , and Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg (1988) ). Furthermore, Loughran and Ritter (1995) argue that investor perception of IPOs seems to be "the triumph of hope over experience," noting that investors appear to systematically overestimate the likelihood of finding the next Microsoft. Given the general market enthusiasm toward IPOs and the newly public firm's appetite for acquisitions, we hypothesize that investors have a tendency to be overly optimistic about the acquisition decisions of IPO firms. We expect that managers of newly-public firms are susceptible to overconfidence in their acquisition decisions, and enthusiastic IPO investors tend to underestimate the likelihood that IPO firm managers will overinvest via acquisitions. This prediction would also be consistent with more general evidence from Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) , who note that increases in capital investment are associated with negative stock returns, suggesting that investors do not fully recognize the empire building risks associated with increasing investment (see also Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) and Lyandres, Sun and Zhang (2008) Recent studies, such as Celikyurt, Sevilir, and Shivdasani (2010) , have highlighted the importance of the acquisition motivation for conducting an IPO but have not examined how these acquisition decisions impact the long-run performance of IPOs. This study contributes to the recent literature by examining whether the acquisition behavior of IPO firms helps to explain 3 The observed negative relationship between capital investment and returns still holds after excluding new issues, suggesting that the new issues effect does not drive the broader capital investment effect.
the long-run negative IPO performance anomaly documented by Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) .
Our results show that IPO firms are active participants in the takeover market, consistent with Brau and Fawcett (2006) and Celikyurt et al. (2010) . Our long-run analysis indicates that the acquisition activity of IPOs is a contributing factor in the long-run underperformance of IPO firms. Newly-public firms that acquire within the first year of going public experience significantly worse long-run performance after the first year than IPO firms that do not acquire in the first year. For example, using benchmark holding period returns following the first year, we find making an acquisition in the first year of going public decreases the three-year holding period return by 28% relative to IPOs that do not acquire in the first year. In addition, based on Fama-French regressions supplemented with an investment factor (e.g., Lyandres et al. (2008)), acquiring IPOs experience significant negative abnormal monthly returns, whereas non-acquiring IPOs exhibit normal monthly returns. These results hold after controlling for other IPO-related factors and are robust to different long-run methodologies. Whereas previous studies have highlighted the desire to acquire as a key motivation for going public, our findings suggest that newly-public firms do not make value-enhancing acquisitions vis-à-vis long-run returns.
II. Data and Univariate Results
To obtain our initial sample of IPO firms, we use the Securities Data Company (SDC) To compare our sample to previous long-run studies, we first measure underperformance as the abnormal buy-and-hold return for a firm from one day after the IPO to three (and five) years after the IPO. Following prior research such as discussed in Ritter and Welch (2002) , we use a characteristic benchmark procedure by subtracting the return over the same horizon for a similar non-issuing firm:
where 3 i AR is the abnormal buy-and-hold return for firm i for months 0 to 36 after going public, is the raw return for firm i in year t after going public (excluding the first day), and is the pair-matched benchmark firm return in month t.
One-year, 2-year, 3-year, 4-year and 5-year cumulative abnormal returns are defined similarly with returns calculated for 0 to 12, 0 to 24, 0 to 36, 0 to 48 and 0 to 60 months after the firm goes public, respectively. Following Loughran and Ritter (1995) , if an IPO delists, the abnormal return is set equal to the buy-and-hold market return at the time of listing, minus the benchmark buy-and-hold return.
For the portfolio benchmarks we first consider market-adjusted returns using the valueweighted CRSP index as a benchmark. Panel A of Table 2 shows that the mean market-adjusted return is significantly negative for 3-, 4-, and 5-year returns. In particular, the mean 3-year (5-year) market-adjusted return in our sample is -11.48% (-14.54%) which is comparable to the poor 3-and 5-year performance for IPOs relative to a market benchmark found in previous studies (e.g., Loughran and Ritter (1995) .
[
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We also consider a benchmark portfolio controlling for style effects (size and book-tomarket) following the method of Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999). We first create a possible matching sample by choosing all firms that have not issued equity within five years and which are plus or minus 30% market capitalization of the IPO firm. 5 Next, we choose the firm that has the closest market-to-book equity ratio that meets the size requirement. If a matching firm delists before the end of the estimation period, we splice in the next closest market-to-book matching firm at the delist date. Panel A of Table 2 shows that the mean 3-year (5-year) styleadjusted return in our sample is -5.4% (-16.5% ). This finding is consistent with previous studies such as Ritter and Welch (2002) that find the mean 3-year style-adjusted return for a similar sample period to be -5.1%. These results are also in line with Brav and Gompers (1997) and others who find that IPO underperformance is sensitive to the benchmark used, and notably smaller after controlling for style effects.
In Panel B, we compare firms that engage in acquisition activity within their first year of going public with firms that do not. The first-year market-adjusted returns for acquirers are significantly higher than those for non-acquirers, suggesting that newly-public firms that have been performing well are more inclined to become acquirers within the first year after going public. While the post-IPO returns tend to be lower for acquirers in the longer performance horizons, the differences are statistically significant only in the 4-year post-IPO time frame based on style-adjusted returns. 6 The good performance of acquirers within the first year, in conjunction with their poor performance over longer time frames in the post-IPO period,
suggests that focusing on performance following the first year will provide a better understanding of how acquisition activity affects the performance of newly-public firms. In addition, examining the performance following the first year is more relevant from a trading-rule perspective, since investors would be able, ex ante to investment, to distinguish acquirers from non-acquirers. 7 Thus, to see how acquirers perform subsequent to acquisition activity, we look at buy-and-hold returns that exclude the first year holding period. We calculate, for example, the 1-to-4-year return for firm i as     36 36
[ INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 6 All difference in means tests control for difference in variances. 7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on this point. If the sample of acquirers is truncated to include IPO firms that acquire only in the first year and do not acquire in subsequent years, then the negative abnormal 2-and 3-year returns in Panel B of Table 2 become statistically significant. However, because of the lookahead bias implicit in such an approach, we do not report these results.
Statistics for abnormal returns excluding the first-year returns are shown in Table 3 . As shown in Panel A, the mean 1-to-4-year market-adjusted (style-adjusted) return in our sample is -8.88% (-8.91%).
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In Panel B, we present the abnormal returns following the first year based on whether IPO firms engage in acquisition activity or not within the first year after going public. The results show that, after the first post-IPO year, the abnormal returns for acquirers are significantly lower than the abnormal returns for non-acquirers in the three to five years following the IPO (not including the first year), regardless of the benchmark used. For example, in years two through four (months 13 through 48) after the IPO, the mean style-adjusted return for acquirers is -28.12%, while the comparable return for non-acquirers is -0.05%. The difference in returns between acquirers and non-acquirers is significant at the 1% level. These findings, and those from Table 2, suggest that, whereas acquirers perform relatively well in the first year after the IPO, these firms show poor performance in the years following the acquisition.
Panels C through E provide similar analysis for firms that acquire within two to four years following the IPO. While the abnormal returns are lower for acquirers than for nonacquirers over most time frames, the results are generally not significantly different for the two groups. Thus, it appears that firms that wait longer than a year to acquire do not show the same underperformance as newly-public firms that acquire shortly after going public. These findings are consistent with the idea that newly public firms that become acquirers are more susceptible to 8 We examined the median buy-and-hold returns and found similar results. However, given that long-run buy-andhold returns are right-skewed, the long-run market-adjusted returns will tend to be negative. Thus, we do not present a statistical analysis of the buy-and-hold median returns. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
over-optimism. If investor enthusiasm towards an IPO wears off after the firm becomes more seasoned, then firms that make acquisitions after a year or more may not be affected as much by excess optimism. Thus, these more seasoned firms would not experience the same degree of underperformance. Furthermore, as managers become more experienced running a publiclytraded company, they may become more realistic about the benefits and costs of their investment decisions.
Next, we decompose the first-year abnormal returns of acquirers into returns accruing to investors before and after the first acquisition. The results are presented in Table 4 . We find that returns for newly-public firms are on average significantly positive before the first acquisition date, indicating that these firms were performing well prior to the acquisition. However, after the acquisition date, the abnormal returns for the acquirers are negative. In particular, as shown in Panel A of Table 4 , the mean market-adjusted (style-adjusted) return for acquirers before the acquisition date is 9.06% (7.97%) compared to -5.03% (-8.17%) after the acquisition date, stopping at 12 months after the IPO date. As shown in Panel B of Table 4 , measuring these returns around the announcement date of the first acquisition, rather than the acquisition date, slightly strengthens this before-versus-after effect. 9 These findings provide further evidence that the underperformance of acquiring firms begins after acquisition activity begins. This finding also suggests a possible causal relation between positive abnormal performance and acquisition activity, as explored in Hovakimian and Hutton (2010) . 9 We use the acquisition date (i.e., effective date) instead of the announcement date in our other tables since not all announced acquisitions are executed, creating a look-ahead bias from a trading perspective. We have, however, checked our results using announcement instead of acquisition dates, and the results are practically the same.
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These initial univariate comparisons demonstrate that acquirers perform worse than nonacquirers after the first year and that this effect can help explain IPO underperformance. In the next section we investigate the robustness of these findings by controlling for other IPO characteristics that may influence post-IPO performance.
III. Multivariate Results
In this section, we incorporate other factors that may influence post-IPO performance and control for these variables in a multivariate regression analysis. Subsequently, to further test the robustness of these findings, we use Fama-French calendar-time regressions to examine the difference in performance for acquiring versus non-acquiring IPOs.
A. Controlling for Other Sources of Underperformance
Prior research has documented that underwriter prestige and venture-capital backing can impact IPO long-run performance (e.g., Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998), and Brav and Gompers (1997) ). Thus, we include variables indicating whether the IPO firm is venture-capital backed (VC) or uses a prestigious underwriter (UW Rank), using the rankings of Loughran and Ritter (2004) . We also control for the owners' share retention and public float using Overhang, which equals shares retained divided by primary shares sold (Bradley and Jordan (2002) ). Age is the number of years from firm founding to the IPO year using data from Loughran and Ritter (2004) .
Finally, following Cotter and Peck (2001) 
Our primary variable of interest is the acquisition indicator, Acquire, which equals one for firms that acquire at least one firm in the first year after going public. In addition to the control variables discussed earlier, we include industry and year dummies to control for influential industries and time periods as demonstrated in the Table 1 frequency distributions.
As shown in Table 6 , whether the firm makes an acquisition in the first year after the IPO is a key factor associated with long-run underperformance, consistent with our earlier univariate findings. Specifically, making an acquisition within the first year (Acquire) lowers the abnormal returns by about 28% over years two through four after going public. This relationship between acquisition activity and long-run underperformance is significant at a p-value of 0.0167. This finding suggests that, while acquisition activity seems to be an important motivation for going public, quick acquisitions end up being destructive to long-term shareholder wealth on average.
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11 The abnormal returns are based on the size and book-to-market matched benchmarks described earlier.
We also used other benchmarks for the regression based on size, size and industry, and the valueweighted market index, and our results are robust to these different benchmarks. Our results are stronger if we use the value-weighted market index instead of the style-adjusted returns reported in the table.
These alternate market-adjusted results are available upon request. 12 We also employed an alternative dependent variable which began measuring long-run returns immediately after the first acquisition, as in (2008)). The results are shown in the last two columns of Table 6 . The findings are largely the same as our previous findings for the full sample. The
Acquire indicator variable shows that newly-public firms that acquire shortly after going public underperform non-acquirers by 27.6%, significant with a p-value of 0.0420. The second model provides evidence that our primary findings are not driven by bubble effects. 13 In robustness tests, we also included the IPO firm's debt ratio, market-to-book equity ratio, investmentto-assets (Lyandres et al. (2008)), and growth in assets (Cooper et al. (2008) ). These variables were insignificant and did not affect our results. When we use abnormal returns beginning at the IPO date, as in Table 2 and in traditional IPO research, many of the control variables are significant.
B. Calendar Time Factor Model Regressions
As an alternative method for examining long-run returns, we use the Fama-French threefactor model approach. Specifically, we use the following regression with the IPO/SEO purged factors provided on Jay Ritter's website (Loughran and Ritter, 2000) :
where:
R pt = the monthly return on an equally-weighted calendar time portfolio of IPOs; r ft = the monthly return on the three-month T-bill;
AR t = the intercept term, Alpha, which provides the mean monthly abnormal return on the calendar-time portfolio;
M t = the monthly return on the value-weighted market index; thus, M t -r ft is the market risk premium (MRP); SMB t = the difference, each month, between the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small and big stocks, purged of IPO and SEO firms;
HML t = the difference, each month, between the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks, purged of IPO and SEO firms.
We use the traditional Fama-French three-factor model as our base case (Table 7 , Panel A and Panel B) of acquiring and non-acquiring IPOs to determine the interplay of acquisition activity and IPO long-run returns. The factor models are run separately for acquiring and nonacquiring IPO firms. The returns for the portfolio of acquiring IPO firms are an equal-weighted average of returns for firms that went public between twelve and forty-eight months prior to the current month and engaged in acquisition activity within the first twelve months of going public.
The returns for the portfolio of non-acquiring IPO firms are an equal-weighted average of returns of firms that went public between twelve and forty-eight months prior to the current month and did not engage in acquisition activity within the first twelve months of going public. 14 We report our Fama-French regression results without the bubble years of 1999 and 2000 in Panel C and
Panel D, and we use the four-factor model with the investment factor in Panels E and Panel F. Table 7 , Panel A, reports that for the group of acquirers, the intercept term of monthly abnormal returns is -0.59%, with a p-value of 0.0501, while the non-acquirer abnormal return is 0.08% and insignificant (Panel B). The three factors all have their expected signs. These findings confirm that IPO firms that make acquisitions within the first year after the IPO experience significant, negative mean monthly returns after their first year of being public whereas IPO firms that do not engage in acquisition activity within the first year do not.
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
We conduct further robustness tests of the influence of the bubble period using our Fama- In Panel E and Panel F, following Lyandres et al. (2008) we add an investment factor to the three-factor regressions for acquirers and non-acquirers. Similar to the previous results, the average monthly abnormal return for acquirers is over seven times worse than for non-acquirers (-0.52% vs. 0.07%). These findings indicate that the IPO decision to acquire shortly after going public has a significantly negative impact on long-run shareholder wealth, separate and distinct from the investment factor's influence on abnormal returns.
IV. Conclusion
Our study suggests that the takeover activity of IPO firms at least partially explains the long-run underperformance for IPOs. IPO firms that become acquirers within the first year after going public have significantly negative excess returns in the years following the merger.
Furthermore, the performance of these IPO firms is significantly lower than IPO firms that do not undertake acquisitions within the first year. These results hold after controlling for a number of other factors that have been shown to affect IPO performance. Our findings suggest that investors tend to underestimate the overinvestment potential of acquisitions made by newly public firms. Overall, these results provide new empirical evidence on the importance of the acquisition decision in affecting the long-run stock price performance of IPO firms.
Franks, J.; R. Harris; and S. Titman. "The Post-Merger Share Price Performance of Acquiring Panel A shows the means of buy-and-hold abnormal returns for 1-through 5-year holding periods. The benchmark returns are either the CRSP value-weighted index ("market adj.") or style-matched firms based on size and book-to-market ratio ("size-BM adj."). In Panel B, abnormal returns are calculated based on whether the firm acquired within the first year of going public. Cluster-adjusted p-value statistics account for year effects. Panel A reports aggregate sample buy-and-hold abnormal returns excluding the first year of being public. Panels B-E compare abnormal returns for firms that acquire within a specific time frame after their IPO date versus firms that do not acquire within this time frame. So, for example, in Panel C the variable AR 2,5 represents the three year buy-andhold abnormal returns starting the second year after IPO through the fifth year after IPO for acquirers who acquire within two years of going public compared to non-acquirers that do not acquire within two years of going public. The benchmark return adjustments are based on either the CRSP value-weighted index ("market-adj.") or style-matched firms according to size and book-to-market ratio ("size-BM adj."). The reported p-values in panels B-E are clusteradjusted for year effects. Ritter (2004) . Overhang, a proxy for share retention, is defined as shares retained divided by primary shares sold, following Bradley and Jordan (2002) . Sales are annual firm sales from the Compustat database as reported on the first available annual statement after the IPO. where: R t = the monthly return on an equally weighted calendar time portfolio; r ft = the monthly return on the three-month T-bill; AR t = the intercept term, the mean monthly abnormal return on the calendar time portfolio; M t = the monthly return on the value-weighted market index; SMB t = the difference, each month, between the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small and big stocks purged of IPO and SEO firms; and HML t = the difference, each month, between the returns of a valueweighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks purged of IPO and SEO firms. Panels A and B use all the years from 1986-2003, while Panels C and D exclude the bubble years of 1999 and 2000.
Control variables

Difference tests
In Panels E and F, we add an investment factor, INV, which is the difference, each month, between the returns of a value-weighted portfolio long in the lowest two deciles of stocks sorted by investment-to-assets and short in the highest two deciles of stocks sorted by investment-to-assets. The returns for the portfolio of acquiring IPO firms are an equal-weighted average of returns for firms that went public between twelve and forty-eight months prior to the current month and engaged in acquisition activity within the first twelve months of going public. The returns for the portfolio of non-acquiring IPO firms are an equal-weighted average of returns of firms that went public between twelve and forty-eight months prior to the current month and did not engage in acquisition activity within the first twelve months of going public. 
